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Center for Biological Diversity v. U.S. Department of Interior, 563 F.3d
466 (D.C. Cir. 2009)
This action arose as a result of the Department of the Interior's
decision to expand the leasing areas for offshore oil and gas development
along Alaska's outer continental shelf. The Leasing Program, which
specifically affects the Beaufort, Bering, and Chukchi Seas off the coast of
Alaska, is supposed to run from 2007 until 2012. Incidentally, the regions
that are subject to the terms of the lease include the habitats of various
species of wildlife, including, but not limited to, polar bears, the Pacific
right whale, and the Pacific walrus.
Petitioners, including the Center for Biological Diversity,
challenged the approval of the expanded Leasing Program by the
Secretary of the Interior on several grounds. Their challenges consisted of
the following: 1) the Interior failed to take into account the Program's
effect on climate change and how such climate change will likely affect
the outer continental shelf, thereby violating both the Outer Continental
Shelf Lands Act (hereinafter "OCSLA") and the National Environmental
Policy Act of 1969 (hereinafter "NEPA"); 2) the Interior further violated
both the OCSLA and NEPA because the Program was approved without
necessary biological baseline research and failed to provide a research
plan detailing how this information will be obtained before the next stage
of the program; 3) the Interior, by failing to consult either the U.S. Fish
and Wildlife Service or the National Marine Fisheries Service about the
Program's potential harm to endangered species, violated the Endangered
Species Act of 1973 (hereinafter "ESA"); and 4) the Interior's Program
irrationally relied on a study by the National Oceanographic and
Atmospheric Administration (hereinafter "NOAA"), which considered the
sensitivity of shoreline areas to oil spills, in assessing the environmental
sensitivity of the areas subject to the Program, thereby violating the
OCSLA.
Upon review, the D.C. Circuit dismissed two claims - the NEPA
baseline claim and the ESA claim - because the claims were not ripe for
review. However, while the court found the remaining claims justiciable,
it ruled that the OCSLA-based climate change claims and the OCSLA-
rooted baseline data challenges lacked merit. Yet, the court found that
petitioners' remaining argument regarding the Program's environmental
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sensitivity rankings had merit and consequently remanded the Leasing
Program to the Secretary of the Interior for reconsideration consistent with
the court's opinion.
Under the court's analysis of the environmental sensitivity ranking
challenge, the Interior's use of the NOAA study would have been
permissible as long as it was not irrational. The court defined irrational as
"based on a consideration of the relevant factors." With this restriction in
mind, the court found that the Interior's sole reliance on the NOAA study
was irrational in light of the OCSLA's requirement that agencies consider
"the relative environmental sensitivity of...different areas of the outer
Continental Shelf." According to the court, since the NOAA study
assessed only the effect of oil spills on shorelines, it is not an adequate
representation of the environmental sensitivity of the outer continental
shelf, which typically extends anywhere from three to two-hundred miles
off the United States' coast. The court ultimately determined that, on
remand, the Secretary of Interior must attempt to identify the areas of the
outer continental shelf that are most and least sensitive to the activity
entailed in the Lease Program.
MICHAEL C. RISBERG
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California ex rel. Lockyer v. U.S. Department of Agriculture, 575 F.3d
999 (9th Cir. 2009)
The Ninth Circuit affirmed the United States District Court for the
Northern District of California's summary judgment decision in favor of
environmental advocacy organizations when it held that the United States
Department of Agriculture (hereinafter "USDA") failed to abide by proper
procedures when promulgating the new State Petitions Rule, which
essentially overrode the Roadless Rule. The Ninth Circuit held that the
Plaintiffs claims were ripe for review, the National Environmental Policy
Act's (hereinafter "NEPA") analysis requirement pertained to the
situation, that the USDA should have "engaged in consultation" under the
Endangered Species Act before promulgating the new rule, and that the
district court did not abuse its discretion in its previous decision to restore
the Roadless Rule.
The Roadless Rule was developed under the Clinton administration
and protected areas in national forests that were largely roadless or
undeveloped. Currently there are 58.5 million acres of inventoried
roadless areas. Before 2001, these roadless areas were controlled by
individual forest plans under the National Forest Management Act. These
individual plans allowed forests to use the roadless areas for activities
such as logging, mining, and construction. In 1999, President Clinton
encouraged the Forest Service to promulgate a national plan for these
roadless areas. In 2001, the Forest Service issued the Roadless Rule,
which forbids construction and timber harvesting in the roadless areas.
Before the Roadless Rule went into effect, the United States
District Court for the District of Idaho enjoined the Forest Service "from
implementing all aspects" of the rule. Environmental groups appealed this
decision, and the Ninth Circuit reversed the decision. In April 2003, the
Roadless Rule went into effect nationally. However, the United States
District Court for the District of Wyoming enjoined the Roadless Rule
three months after it went into effect. Again, environmental groups
appealed the decision. Before the Tenth Circuit issued a decision, the
Forest Service issued a new rule called the State Petitions Rule, and the
Tenth Circuit dismissed the appeal for want of jurisdiction.
This appeal arose from two consolidated district court cases of
state and environmental advocacy group as plaintiffs and the USDA and
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the Forest Service as defendants. The plaintiffs alleged that the defendants
"violated (1) the NEPA by relying on a categorical exclusion when
promulgating the State Petitions Rule; (2) Section 7 of the Endangered
Species Act by promulgating the State Petitions Rule without fulfilling the
Act's consultation requirements; and (3) the rationality requirement of the
Administrative Procedure Act by "failing to articulate a purpose and need
for rescission of the Roadless Rule."
The District Court granted summary judgment for the plaintiffs,
holding that the "USDA violated the NEPA and the Endangered Species
Act." Moreover, the District Court reinstated the Roadless Rule and
enjoined the State Petitions Rule. The court reasoned that because the
State Petitions Rule lifted the Roadless Rule's "substantive protections," it
triggered the analysis necessary under the NEPA. Furthermore, the court
held that the rule did not constitute a "routine administrative action,"
which would have triggered a categorical exclusion. Instead, the court
held that the passing of the rule was "arbitrary and capricious." The
district court also held that the State Petitions Rule violated the
Endangered Species Act because the repealing of the Roadless Rule would
have some effect on endangered species.
Defendants appealed, challenging that the State Petitions Rule
neither triggered the NEPA nor the Endangered Species Act because the
rule was merely procedural in nature and would not have any bearing on
the environment. The Ninth Circuit determined that the action was ripe
for review and that the court should apply a "reasonableness" standard of
review.
The Ninth Circuit held that the NEPA applied to this situation
because the State Petitions Rule overruled the Roadless Rule, which
provided greater protection to the environment than laws before it. First,
the Ninth Circuit concluded that the Roadless Rule was in effect long
enough to be "meaningfully" in force because it had a positive effect on
the environment of roadless areas. Furthermore, the USDA repeatedly
noted that it meant to replace the Roadless Rule with the State Petitions
Rule, and the Ninth Circuit cited this as reason why it is a substantive-
not merely procedural-change in the law. Therefore, it does not fall
within a categorical exception.
Moreover, since the action may have affected endangered species,
the new rule triggered the Endangered Species Act. The Ninth Circuit
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held that the USDA acted arbitrarily when determining that endangered
species would not be affected by the State Petitions rule. Shortly before
the State Petitions Rule came into existence, USDA concluded that the
habitats of endangered species were in grave danger and subsequently
used the Roadless Rule to protect these species. The Ninth Circuit then
considered how the State Petitions Rule repealed the Roadless Rule, and
held that, indeed, the USDA acted arbitrarily when determining that
endangered species would not be affected by the new rule.
The Ninth Circuit affirmed the district court's enjoining of the
State Petitions Rule and reinstatement of the Roadless Rule. Because the
Ninth Circuit found that the State Petitions Rule was a substantive change
in the law and that the rule triggered the Endangered Species Act, it




Hydro Resources, Inc. v. EPA, 562 F.3d 1249 (10th Cir. 2009)
In February 2007, the Environmental Protection Agency
(hereinafter "EPA") determined that land owned by Hydro Resources, Inc.
(hereinafter "HRI") in northwestern New Mexico was Indian land and
therefore subject to federal regulation under the Safe Drinking Water Act
(hereinafter "SDWA"). Before that determination, HRI had planned to
operate a uranium mine on the land, and the New Mexico Environmental
Department (hereinafter "NMED") had already given its approval. HRI
filed suit to overturn the EPA's determination, and the district court
granted summary judgment for the EPA. HRI appealed to the Tenth
Circuit, which affirmed.
The SDWA establishes minimum drinking water protection
standards. Specifically, it establishes an underground injection control
program to prevent underground injections that would endanger drinking
water sources. Generally, these regulations are implemented and enforced
by the states. However, Indian country is under the statutory jurisdiction
of the EPA.
According to the SDWA, Indian country is defined as land
dependant on Indian communities and allotments. Upon conferring with
the Department of the Interior and the Navajo Nation, the EPA found that
HRI's land, though not located on a reservation, was located within the
Church Rock Chapter, a local government organization of the Navajo
Nation, and thus subject to federal regulation. Prior to that decision, the
status of the land was not thought to be in dispute. In fact, the NMED had
already approved HRI's request for a state permit in 1989. It was not until
1996, when the Navajo Nation attempted to assert control over the land,
that the EPA got involved. At that time, the EPA determined that there
was a legitimate dispute as to the status of the land, and found that a
federal permit was therefore necessary. HRI challenged that
determination in court and the Tenth Circuit found that the EPA did not
err in finding a legitimate dispute as to the status of the land. In 2007,
after much investigation, the EPA determined that the land was Indian
land because of its ties to the Navajo's Church Rock Chapter. It was this
determination that gave rise to the present dispute.
The court first disposed of the EPA's argument that it had no
standing to review the district court's decision. The EPA argued that
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because the land would be subject to the same regulations regardless of
whether the NMED or EPA enforced the regulations, HRI suffered no
harm as a result of the EPA's determination that it had jurisdiction. The
court found that because HRI had already obtained a permit from the
NMED, forcing the company to obtain another permit from the EPA
would cause additional expense.
The court next turned to the issue of whether the land in question
qualified as Indian land under the SDWA. Among the requirements are
that the land is actually occupied by an Indian community and that the
federal government and the Indians, rather than the state, have primary
jurisdiction. The court determined that it was not error for the EPA to find
that the Church Rock Chapter was an Indian community with defined
borders that included the land owned by HRI. Additionally, because the
federal government retained title to a vast majority of the property in
question, the court found the federal government had primary jurisdiction
over the area. In the face of a dissent on the grounds that the court was
giving the Indian tribe too much power over private land owned by non-
Indians, the court narrowly tailored its decision to the facts of this case. It
warned that if an Indian tribe were to overreach its authority in attempting
to govern private lands that happened to be located on Indian grounds, the
courts would step in.
Currently, the Tenth Circuit has granted a petition for rehearing




Ecology Center v. Castaneda, 562 F.3d 986 (9th Cir. 2009)
Environmental groups Wildwest Institute and The Ecology Center
("Plaintiffs") filed suit against the United States Forest Service ("Forest
Service") for approving nine timber sale projects in the Kootenai National
Forest in Montana. The Forest Service adopted the Kootenai National
Forest Plan ("Forest Plan") in 1987 to guide "all natural resource
management activities" for the forest. In compliance with the Forest Plan,
the Forest Service adopts projects for small parts of the forest, including
the nine timber sale projects at issue in this case.
Plaintiffs had several complaints, including violations of the
National Forest Management Act ("NFMA"), the National Environmental
Policy Act ("NEPA"), and Forest Service regulations. The United States
District Court for the District of Montana considered these arguments and
granted the Forest Service summary judgment on all three claims.
Plaintiffs appealed that decision, and the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals
reviewed the district court's decision.
Plaintiffs first argued that the Forest Service failed to comply with
NFMA's procedural and substantive requirements, which state that forest
plans must "provide for diversity of plant and animal communities" and
ensure that timber will not be harvested in a way that causes irreversible
damage to the soil, slope, or watershed conditions.
Next, Plaintiffs argued that the Forest Service violated NEPA
procedural requirements that force decision-makers (in this case, the
Forest Service) to analyze the environmental impact of their actions and
allow public access to that information.
Plaintiffs also argued that two of the Forest Service's regulations
were not followed. First, the Forest Service was required to identify and
monitor indicator species. The regulation states that "fish and wildlife
habitat shall be managed to maintain viable populations of existing native
and desired non-native vertebrate species." The second regulation
required the actors to use the "best available science" when implementing
the plans.
In analyzing these claims, the Ninth Circuit found that the Forest
Service had determined that the projects would create ten percent old-
growth forest levels, and this was sufficient to ensure species viability.
Old-growth forests are forests that have developed past their dominant
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species because they have been mostly undisturbed for a long period of
time. The determination of the ten-percent-old-growth-forest-levels
standard was based upon the best available science and was not arbitrary
or capricious because it was based on the standard set by the National
Forest Management Act of 1976. Therefore, no Forest Service regulations
were violated.
The Ninth Circuit also found that approving the nine timber sale
and restoration projects in the Kootenai National Forest was lawful under
NFMA. And because the Forest Service prepared environmental impact
statements and environmental assessments as required by the NEPA, they
adequately considered and disclosed the environmental impact of the
projects. Therefore, the Forest Service did not violate NFMA or NEPA
regulations.
The Ninth Circuit affirmed the district court's holding, and the




Summers v. Earth Island Institute, 129 S. Ct. 1142 (2009)
The United States Forest Service (hereinafter "Forest Service")
instituted the Burnt Ridge Project (hereinafter "the project") to salvage
timber from Sequoia National Forest, which is federal land inflicted with
fire-damage. The project's intent was to sell the timber salvaged on the
238 acres of land under a Forest Service exemption from traditional
notice, comment, and appeal procedures in order to conduct small sales of
"fire-rehabilitation and timber-salvage projects." Forest Service's
endeavor was challenged by various environmental groups, collectively
referred to as Earth Island, in the Eastern District of California. The
environmental groups sought not only to halt the sale of the salvaged
timber, but also to invalidate the regulation permitting the notice and
comment exception.
A preliminary injunction granted by the district court prevented the
sale of timber. However, the environmental groups continued to challenge
the permissibility of the regulations permitting notice and comment
circumvention. The case proceeded to the United States Supreme Court
on certiorari to determine whether the environmental groups had standing
to challenge the regulations, as the parties had settled matters related
specifically to the project.
Whereas the Forest Service Decisionmaking and Appeals Reform
Act (hereinafter "the Act") requires Forest Service to promulgate a notice,
comment, and appeals procedure for land use projects, several categorical
exclusions were incorporated into that regulation, one of which includes
fire-rehabilitation and timber-salvage sales of 250 or fewer acres of land.
The fundamental doctrine of standing requires that persons, or
environmental groups, bringing suit have a personal stake in the case or
controversy warranting adjudication of the matter, which, if favorable, will
redress that person or group's injury. As pointed out by the Supreme
Court, the Act regulates the conduct of Forest Services, only, and not the
conduct of the environmental groups. Moreover, the Court also rejected,
as a sufficient personal stake in the case to establish standing, the intent of
certain members of the environmental group to visit the National Forest in
the future. Furthermore, the environmental group's assertion that they
suffered procedural injury because of the inability to file comments was
also deemed insufficient by the Court to establish standing.
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Finding the environmental groups lacked sufficient standing, the
Supreme Court declined to evaluate the merits of the case by refusing to




Friends of the Everalades v. South Florida Water Management District,
570 F.3d 1210 (11th Cir. 2009)
In Friends of the Everglades v. South Florida Water Management
District, the Friends of the Everglades (hereinafter "Friends") sought
injunctive relief against the South Florida Water Management District
(hereinafter "Water District") to require it to obtain a permit under the
Clean Water Act (hereinafter "CWA") and in accordance with the
National Pollution Discharge Elimination System (hereinafter "NPDES").
The CWA requires a NPDES permit anytime there is a "discharge of any
pollutant." The CWA defines a discharge as "any addition of any
pollutant to navigable waters from any point source." On June 13, 2008,
the EPA promulgated a regulation, stating any transfer of water between
distinct bodies of water is not subject to the NPDES permitting program.
The facts were not in dispute at trial or on appeal. The Water
District conceded that it was pumping polluted water uphill from
agricultural canals into Lake Okeechobee. The Water District stated that
the purpose of these transfers, between two distinct bodies of water, was to
maintain the Florida state water system and that it did not introduce any
pollutants into the water by pumping the polluted canals into the higher
lake water.
The main issue decided by the court was whether the court was
required to give the new EPA regulation deference pursuant to the
Supreme Court test in Chevron. Under Chevron, the Supreme Court held
that a court must give deference to an administrative body's interpretation
of a statute it administers, if the body's construction of the statute is
reasonable and the statute's meaning is ambiguous.
The Water District contended that the court should give deference
to the new EPA regulation, pursuant to Chevron, because the CWA statute
is ambiguous and the EPA regulation interpreting the statute is reasonable.
The Water District argued that the CWA statute is ambiguous because
there are two different but reasonable interpretations of the statute. The
EPA regulation supports the Water District's interpretation that the phrase
"navigable waters" should be construed as the collective waters of the
United States. The Water District argued that the absence of the word
"any" preceding "navigable waters" is indicative of Congress not
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intending the statute to cover water transfers between separate bodies of
water and thus, the EPA's interpretation is a reasonable construction of the
statute.
Friends rejected the Water District's argument that the unitary
waters theory is reasonable, stating that the statute is clear and
unambiguous and that an addition to navigable waters is governed by the
NPDES permitting program. Friends argued this pumping was an addition
of a pollutant to navigable waters from a point source and that the Water
District's pumping without an NPDES permit was a violation of the CWA.
The plaintiff also cited numerous past Circuit Court cases decided prior to
the EPA regulation that held that the unitary waters theory is inapplicable.
Friends maintained that the past decisions of the Federal Courts clearly
demonstrate that the CWA statute is not ambiguous. Plaintiffs concluded
by stating that the lack of ambiguity does not satisfy a required prong of
the Chevron analysis, and thus does not compel the court to defer to the
EPA regulation.
After dispatching with an Eleventh Amendment immunity issue,
the circuit court focused its analysis on the clarity of the CWA statute.
The court explained that the main question was the definition of the statute
and whether the addition of pollutants to the "navigable waters" of the
United States means addition to all the waters in the United States as a
whole or the waters in an individual sense. The circuit court noted that
Friends' argument would require the insertion of "any" into the statute
before the phrase "navigable waters." Citing maxims of judicial statutory
interpretation, the court clarified that it was not allowed to add or subtract
words from a statute for interpretive purposes. The court stated that under
Friends' argument, the necessity of adding a word to support its
conclusion is indicative of the statute being ambiguous, thus supporting
the Water District's argument.
The circuit court also rejected Friends' contention that Congress'
stated purpose of the CWA is contrary to the EPA's regulations and
interpretation of the statute. Friends argued that the CWA's purpose is to
restore and protect the Nation's waters as indicated by the CWA preamble.
Friends asserted that the unitary waters theory and the EPA regulation is
contrary to the purpose of the CWA because it would allow water from the
worst polluted bodies of water to be pumped into pristine waters. In its
rejection of this argument, the court stated that congressional acts are the
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result of compromise and the political process, and not all statutes will
comport with the desired purpose of an act as a whole.
After concluding that the statute is ambiguous because of the two
reasonable readings of both parties, the court analyzed the second
remaining prong of the Chevron analysis, whether the EPA's regulation
was a reasonable interpretation of the statute. The court explained that its
analysis had revealed the unitary waters theory to be a reasonable reading
of the statute and that the EPA's regulation was not "arbitrary, capricious,
or manifestly contrary to the statute." The circuit court concluded that it
was required to give deference to the EPA's regulation because the EPA's
construction of the statute was reasonable and the statute's meaning was
ambiguous because of the two possible interpretations. The court reversed
the lower court's decision, holding that the Water District's pumping from
one body of water to another is not subject to the NPDES permit program.
BRIAN SCHIERDING
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United States v. Cundiff, 555 F.3d 200 (6th Cir. 2009)
In 1990, Rudy Cundiff bought tracts of land in Muhlenberg
County, Kentucky that are adjacent to tributaries of the Green River.
When Rudy bought the land, the wetlands on property were filled with
"acidic orangish to reddish colored water" that had drained out of an
abandoned coal mine located on a neighboring property. After his
purchase, Cundiff began clearing the property to make the wetlands
suitable for farming. In 1991, the Army Corps of Engineers observed this
clearing and suspected Clean Water Act violations. As a result, the Corps
sent Cundiff a cease-and-desist letter for failing to obtain a permit to fill
the wetlands that had been located on the property and, therefore, violating
the Clean Water Act. The cease-and-desist letters continued over the
course of eight years and Cundiff continued to ignore the orders of the
Army Corps of Engineers, the Environmental Protection Agency, and
Kentucky state officials. The United States finally sued Cundiff alleging
violations of the Clean Water Act for discharging pollutants into waters of
the United States without a permit. The trial court enjoined Cundiff from
discharging any pollutants into the wetlands and imposed a civil penalty of
$200,000. Cundiff appealed the verdict and while the appeal was pending,
the United States Supreme Court issued its opinion of Rapanos v. United
States, 547 U.S. 718 (2006). In Rapanos, the issue was what constituted
"navigable waters of the United States" under the Clean Water Act. Thus,
on appeal, Cundiff's principal argument was that the wetlands on his
property did not constitute "navigable waters of the United States" and,
therefore, did not fall under the jurisdiction of the Clean Water Act.
Rapanos held that "waters of the United States" included some
bodies of water that were not considered navigable in the traditional sense.
The plurality held that the Clean Water Act phrase to include "relatively
permanent, standing, or continuously flowing bodies of water." The court
also held this included wetlands with a "continuous surface connection to
such water bodies." In Marks v. United States, the Court held that in
analyzing the statutory phrase, the court should take the approach that
changes the law the least. Because Rapanos and Marks were not easily




The court chose to use a case-by-case basis test dictated by Justice
Kennedy in his concurrence to the Rapanos decision. Under this test, the
first question was whether the adjacent property contains a "water of the
United States." The court found that because the creeks and channels
located on Cundiff s land were permanent bodies of water connected to
"interstate navigable waters," such as the Green River, the Clean Water
Act was correctly applied to this case by the district court. The court held
that the affected tributaries of the Green River not only affected
navigation, but also food webs, crop production, and bank erosion.
The next question posed was whether the wetlands in question are
in "continuous surface connection" with the Green River's tributaries.
The plurality's test in Rapanos requires a topical flow of water between a
navigable waterway or its tributary with a wetland. The court also stated
that the connection must include some kind of water or "dampness" that
polluting such land would have a proportionate affect on the waterway.
The court held that because the wetland that Cundiff filled constituted
approximately 5.3 acres and had a "continuous surface connection" with at
least two major tributaries of the Green River, the land in question also
met this standard of Justice Kennedy's test. Therefore, the Sixth Circuit
affirmed the district court's grant of summary judgment to the government
and also affirmed the district court's award of civil penalties levied on
Cundiff.
NICOLE HUTSON
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